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Abstract
We analyze the efficiency of the pattern of public spending when
two asymmetric economies are not perfectly integrated and their pri-
vate sectors are imperfectly competitive. We show that tax harmoniza-
tion constrains the low productivity country to set higher subsidies
for firms. Moreover, while households located in the low productivity
country seem to be the net-contributors of their public sector regard-
less the level of trade costs, residents of the more advanced country
may shift from a position of net-contributors to net-recipient when
trade costs are low enough. Finally, we isolate two main externalities
suggesting that a coordinated policy increasing the public spendings
for households in both countries will be beneficial. Thus, with a very
different framework, our results seem to confirm the robustness of the
main conclusion of Keen and Marchand (1997): governments could
spend too much for firms and the inefficiency arising from competition
for multinationals concerns both the level of taxation and the resulting
pattern of public spending.
∗Corresponding author. e-mail: stephane.riou@univ-st-etienne.fr. address: stephane
riou, creuset, 6 rue basse des rives 42023 Saint-Etienne, cedex 02.
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1 Introduction
Countries may affect business location decisions in essentially two ways:
by implementing an attractive tax policy, and by developing a favourable
economic environment. Many models show that trade integration and the
increasing mobility of capital likely intensify the tax competition to at-
tract firms implying too low levels of public expenditures (for a survey see
Wildasin and Wilson, 2003). However little attention has been given to the
impact of economic integration on the pattern of public spending despite
the obvious policy relevance of the subject. Indeed, on the one hand, be-
cause tax competition could be harmful, tax coordination is now high on the
political agenda of the OECD countries (and especially in UE). This could
make the subsidies competition for firms more vigorous. On the other hand,
the location of multinational firms seems to be driven by spatial differences
in public inputs or subsidies (Bénassy-Quéré, Gobalraja and Trannoy, 2005;
Head, Ries and Swenson, 1999)1. Consequently, there is a risk that more
economic integration combined with more tax coordination modify the des-
tination of public expenditures in favour of firms and to the detriment of
households which are less geographically mobile2.
A recent theoretical literature deals with the impact of competition be-
tween jurisdictions on the composition of public spending. From a tradi-
tional model of tax competition without trade, Keen and Marchand (1997)
argue that fiscal competition may indeed lead to systematic distortions of
the pattern of public spending. Governments spend too much in public
input for firms compared to public good for workers. This result may not
hold when residents are mobile because a shift of public good provision de-
voted to workers in favour to firms may induce a labor outflow (Matsumoto,
2000). A similar result is obtained by Borck (2004) by distinguishing mobile
and immobile workers. However, these models consider that the location of
capital is only driven by public policies (through taxation and the expen-
1Several cases in which US and European governments have paid large location subsi-
dies are well known. After a strong competition between several european countries, the
Korean company Daewoo was deciding to locate a production plant in France in 1994.
The amount of direct subsidies is estimated at 30 Millions Euros added to 2 Millions euros
of tax exemptions on corporate tax rates.
2Notice also empirical evidences reveal a correlation between trade integration and
pattern of public spending. For example, from a sample of 23 OECD countries, Rodrik
(1998) shows a positive relationship between trade openness and public expenditure vary-
ing with respect to the type of government spending. More recently, Sanz and Velazquez
(2004) find a σ-convergence concerning the structure of government expenditures among
the OECD member states.
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ditures). One need to consider as well incentives to location coming from
the private market forces whose strength is shaped by economic integration.
We know that firms producing under imperfect competition have a strong
incentive to agglomerate when trade costs become low enough in order to
exploit scale economies (Krugman, 1991, Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse,
2002, Combes and Overman, 2005). Such mechanisms modify strategic tax
policies. The government of the country where firms are concentrated can
tax the ’agglomeration rent’ that firms enjoy without inducing relocation,
as shown Ludema and Wooton (1998), Kind et al. (1998) and Ottaviano
and Van Ypersele (2005) from different models of economic geography.
The main purpose of the present paper is to analyse of the role played
by trade integration in the destination of public spending. We also deter-
mine whether the coordination of public subsidies for firms is necessary. To
explore these questions, we elaborate an economic geography framework à
la Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). Two countries compete to attract
multinationals in an environment of imperfect competition with barriers to
trade. Our model is close to Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) since we
consider asymmetric competition between governments to attract firms (a
country benefits to an comparative advantage) and two tax instruments (a
tax on the workers’ wage and a tax on firms’ profit). However, unlike Otta-
viano and van Ypersele (2004), we consider that tax revenues can be shared
between an individual subsidy to mobile firms and an other one to immobile
households. Since we focus on the pattern of public spending and its relation
with trade integration, tax rates are exogenous.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the country en-
joying a productivity advantage set lower net-of-tax subsidy for each firm
than the other country. Nevertheless, both subsidies describe an identical
bell-shaped relationship with trade liberalisation. Secondly, we show that
the most generous country in terms of subsidy per firm is not necessary the
country with the highest budget devoted to the economic activity located in
its area. Provided that both trade costs and corporate tax rates are high,
the high-productivity country can spend more for firms and households than
the low-productivity country. Moreover, we show that households located
in the low productivity country are the net-contributors of the public policy
regardless the level of trade cost, while advanced stage of trade integration
may twist the position of households located in the high productivity coun-
try from a role of net-contributor to a role of net-recipient. Finally, we
wonder if the pattern of public spending is efficient from a social optimum
point of view. We identify two types of externalities, one passing through
the consumers’ surplus, the second arising from the net benefit of the pub-
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lic spending for immobile households. While both externalities may act in
opposite directions depending on the level of trade integration, we find that
the aggregate welfare would be improved by a coordinated reduction in the
provision of subsidies to firms.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The model is developed in
the next section. In section 3, we display the location equilibrium for given
public policies. Then, in section 4, we determine the level of susbsidies
for firms in each country arising from Nash competition among benevolent
governments. Section 5 proposes a welfare analysis and section 6 concludes.
2 A simple model of location and trade
We consider an economy made of two countries, labelled r = 1, 2. There are
two sectors, a private sector and a public sector. The private sector consists
of a modern industry (M) and a traditional one (T ). The M-sector produces
a continuum of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product under in-
creasing returns, using workers as the only input. The T-sector produces a
homogenous good (the numéraire) under constant returns, using also work-
ers as the only input. Firms of the M-sector are multinational owned by
outside shareholders and perfectly mobile between regions. We focus on
multinational firms since there are clear evidences that this category of firms
largely benefits from subsidy policies (see, for instance Bénassy-Quéré, Gob-
alraja and Trannoy, 2005; Head, Ries and Swenson, 1999). Indeed, various
benefits are waiting from the attraction of multinational firms: jobs, produc-
tivity spillovers, market access spillovers (eg. Blomström and Kokko, 1998).
Workers are not mobile between regions but are mobile between private sec-
tors and their spatial distribution is uniform (L1 = L2 = L ). Countries only
differ in productivity in the modern industry. The public sector consists of
two governments providing a subsidy to mobile firms (fr) and a subsidy to
immobile households (hr). While the subsidy to immobile households can
be viewed as social spendings, the public policy for firms may include the
most direct instruments by which a country reduced the cost of doing busi-
ness within its boundaries. Among the most frequent incentives, we can cite
various forms of tax exemptions, grants, land acquisitions for firms or the
development of enterprise zones which have effects on the location choice
but do not directly affect labour and capital productivity3.
3Observe that countrary to our assumption, most of the papers on the pattern of public
spendings assume public inputs that complement particular private factors of production
(see. Matsumoto, 2004, Keen and Marchand, 1997).
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2.1 Consumption
Preferences are identical across workers and, following Ottaviano et al.
(2002), are captured by a quasi-linear quadratic utility given by:
u(.) = α
∫ n
0
q (i) di−
β − δ
2
∫ n
0
[q (i)]2 di−
δ
2
[∫ n
0
q (i)di
]2
+ qO (1)
where α > 0 and β > δ > 0. In this expression, α measures the intensity
of preferences for the differentiated product with respect to the numéraire.
The condition β > δ implies that workers have a preference for variety.
Finally, q (i) is the quantity of variety i ∈ [0, n] and qO the quantity of the
numéraire. Each worker is endowed with qO > 0 units of the numéraire. The
initial endowment is supposed to be large enough for her/his consumption of
the numéraire to be strictly positive at the market outcome. Her/his budget
constraint can then be written as follows:∫ n
0
p (i) q (i)di+ qO = qO + yr (2)
where p (i) is the consumer price of variety i and yr is the workers’s net
income residing in country r with
yr ≡ wr + hr − ρr
with wr the wage tax prevailing in country r, hr is the amount of the subsidy
for each inhabitants living in country r and ρr means the unit tax rate
on wages. Given the assumption of symmetry between varieties, solving
the consumption problem yields the demand functions for a representative
variety located in r from region r (qrr) and region s with s = r (qrs):
qrr = a− (b+ cn) prr + cPr qrs = a− (b+ cn) prs + cPs (3)
where
a ≡ α/ [β + (n− 1) δ] b ≡ 1/ [β + (n− 1) δ] c ≡ δ/ (β − δ) [β + (n− 1) δ]
and prr (resp., prs) is the price of a variety located in region r to consumers
of region r (resp., s). Finally,
Pr = nrprr + nspsr Ps = nrprs + nspss (4)
are the price indices (i.e., n times the average price) of varieties in region r
and in region s, respectively, with nr and ns the number of varieties/firms
located in r and s.
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2.2 Private sector
There are two private sectors. The traditional sector produces a homoge-
neous good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. One
unit of output requires one unit of labor. The T-good is costlessly traded
between regions so that its price is the same everywhere. This makes that
good the natural choice for the numéraire, which implies that price of the
T-good (pT ) and, the equilibrium wage of immobile workers (wT ) are equal
to one everywhere. The T-sector is not taxed since equilibrium profits are
zero.
The modern sector supplies varieties under increasing returns to scale
and monopolistic competition. There exists a one-to-one correspondence
between firms and varieties. Firms of M-sector compete within a large group
of firms. The total mass of firms in this sector is fixed and is equal to n.4 We
consider a market structure with monopolistic competition in which entry
is restricted instead of being free. Thus, firms have a market power and will
earn positive profits which will be taxed by governments. For a firm located
in country r, the production of any variety requires a fixed amount φr of
labor L with
φ2 > φ1
In other words, we assume that country 1 has an advantage in terms of
productivity.
Varieties of M-good are traded at a cost of τ units of the numéraire per
unit shipped between the two countries. As firms bear trade costs, profits
of a representative firm in region r are as follows:
πr = prrqrrLr + (prs − τ) qrsLs − φr − tr + fr with r = s (5)
where Lr (resp., Ls) is the number of workers located in country r (resp., s),
tr is the unit tax in region r and fr is the subisidy for each firm established
in country r. Note that because labour is mobile between sectors, the wage
rate is fixed to 1 in the M-sector. Nevertheless, this will be verified only if
the sector T is always active in both regions. Then, we have to ensure that
a single location alone cannot supply the world demand in the homogeneous
good. The condition is 1 < 2qO.
5.
4Picard et al. (2004) have the same assumption in a spatial version of Dixit-Stiglitz
model.
5An other condition indicates that full agglomeration of the modern sector in one
region is not sufficient to promote equilibrium in the labor market of this region, that is
L > 2φrN where φrN is the number of workers employed in the modern sector when a
core-periphery configuration emerges.
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When producers maximise profits, they take the price indices as given.
Nevertheless, the market as a whole has a non negligible impact on each
firm’s choice in that each firm must account for the distribution of all firms’
prices through an aggregate statistics (the price index) in order to find its
equilibrium price. Thus, the market solution is given by a Nash equilibrium
with a continuum of players in which prices are interdependent. We assume
that markets are internationally segmented so that each firm chooses a de-
livered price which is specific to the country in which its variety is sold. The
profit-maximizing prices are the same obtained by Ottaviano et al. (2002)
and are given by
prr =
1
2
2a+ τc(n− nr)
cn+ 2b
prs = pss +
τ
2
(6)
Freight absorption by firms located for instance in country r is a de-
creasing function of their relative number. The reason is that as nr falls,
the market in region s becomes more crowded pushing down local prices.
As a result, the elasticity of demand for firms located in r rises on foreign
sales while falling on domestic ones. The result is that they find convenient
to reduce their operating margins on foreign sales while increasing them on
domestic sales (Brander and Krugman, 1983).
By inspection, it is readily verified that prr is increasing in τ because
the local firms are more protected against foreign competition. By contrast,
prs − τ is decreasing because it is now more difficult for firms to sell on the
foreign market. As firms’ prices net of trade costs are to be positive for any
distribution of workers, we assume throughout this paper that
τ < τ trade ≡
2a
2b+ cn
. (7)
This condition also guarantees that it is always profitable for a firm to export
to the other region.
2.3 Public sector
We consider that each country maximises the aggregated welfare of work-
ers/consumers living in its jurisdiction given by
Wr = SrL+ (1 + hr − ρr)L (8)
with Sr is the consumer’s surplus in country r given by
Sr =
a2n
2b
− a(nrprr + nspsr) +
b+ cn
2
(nrp
2
rr + nsp
2
sr)−
c
2
(nrprr + nspsr)
2
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where prices are given by (6). An increasing number of firms located in coun-
try r raises the surplus of workers living in this country since the price of local
varieties decreases and less varieties are imported. Unlike Keen and Marc-
hand (1997) there is no indirect effects of the public spending to firms on the
level of the capital rent which would be internalized by the government. A
major argument is that ownership of plant of multinational corporations is
usually geographically widespread. Thus it will have a very marginal impact
on the residents’ welfare that governments can neglect. Observe that this
assumption is supported by Keen and Marchand (1997) who consider that it
would also be beneficial to assume a case of foreign direct investments when
analysing the pattern of public spending. For them, it would mitigate the
tendency towards relative over-provision of public spendings to firms.
Public funds have two possible allocations: an individual subsidy for
firms (fr) or for immobile residents (hr) so that
Gr = hrLr + frλrn (9)
where Gr is the level of public expenditures in country r and λr = nr/n
is the share of firms located in country r with λr + λs = 1. To finance
these public spendings, two tax instruments are used : a unit tax rate on
profits (tr) and a unit tax rate on wages (ρr). Therefore, in each country,
tax revenues are expressed as follows:
Tr = trλrn+ ρrL (10)
Given the budget constraint, Gr = Tr, using (10) and (9) leads to the
following equality:
(hr − ρr)Lr = (tr − fr)λrn. (11)
This means that, when the grants net of profit tax rate are positive in
country r (tr−fr < 0), workers living in this country are the net contributors
in the redistribution system (hr − ρr < 0) and vice-versa.
Because we focus on the composition of public spending and not on the
level of public expenditures, we assume that the level of tax rates in each
country is exogenous (because of tax coordination, for example). However,
tax revenue in each country remains endogenous since it depends on the
spatial distribution of tax base.
2.4 Sequence of events
There are two types of actors in our model: firms and governments. In the
first stage, each government chooses simultaneously its individual subsidy
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for firms fr taking as given the decision of the other local government, and
anticipating the private sector outcomes and the resulting location equilib-
rium. In stage 2, given the preferences announced by the governments, firms
choose their place of production. All players have a perfect information and
the game is solved by a sub-game perfect equilibrium involving backward
induction beginning with the last stage.
3 Location equilibrium
The location of firms is governed by the spatial differences in net profits,
πr = Πr − φr − tr + fr (12)
where Πr is the equilibrium gross profits earned by a firm established in r
on the market of the region r and s with
Πr ≡ (b+ cn) (prr)
2 L+ (b+ cn) (prs − τ)
2 L
where we have introduced (3) and (4) in (5). In our model, price competition
acts as a dispersion force while the difference in productivity favours the
clustering of firms in the high productivity country.
An interior equilibrium exists if and only if πr = πs. This leads to the
following location equilibrium:
λ∗ =
1
2
+A(τ )(f1 − t1 − f2 + t2 + θ) (13)
where
θ ≡ φ2 − φ1 > 0 A(τ) ≡
2b+ cn
cnLτ2 (b+ cn)
> 0
It is straightforward to check that ∂λ∗/∂θ > 0 and ∂2λ∗/∂θ∂τ < 0. In
other words, the high productivity country is more and more attractive when
trade costs decline. Such a result is similar to one obtained with a home
market effect. The attractivity of the country having the highest market
size increases with the degree of economic integration (see Ottaviano and
Thisse, 2004).
4 Endogenous subsidy for firms
The objective of each national government is to maximise (8) with respect
to fr given by
Max
fr
Wr = SrL+ trλrn− frλrn+ L
9
where we have introduced (11) in (8), taking as given the decision of the
other government. For each country, first-order condition is expressed as
follows
dWr
dfr
= L
∂Sr
∂λr
∂λr
∂fr
+ trn
∂λr
∂fr
− λrn− frn
∂λr
∂fr
= 0
Clearly, each country has incentives to raise subsidies for firms in order
to increase, in one hand, the surplus (dSr/dfr > 0) via a rise in λr and, on
the other hand, the tax revenue (trn∂λr/∂fr > 0) via a rise in tax base.
Nevertheless, each country has an incentive to diminish subsidies for firms
in order to increase subsidies for households (−λrn− frn∂λr/∂fr < 0). At
Nash equilibrium, we have
f∗1 = t1 −Bθ +C(τ)  0 (14)
f∗2 = t2 +Bθ +C(τ) > 0 (15)
where
B ≡
(8b+ 5cn)
2(12b+ 7cn)
∈ (1/3, 1/2)
C(τ) ≡
τ(b+ cn)L
2(2b+ cn)2
[
2a(b+ cn)− τ(b2 + 3bcn+ c2n2)
]
> 0
for admissible values of τ .
Some calculations show that we have f∗1 > f
∗
2 when
θ < θ˜ ≡
t1 − t2
2B
Clearly, identifying the country providing the highest level of individual
subsidy for firms requires to compare the productivity gap with the relative
taxation of firms. We first consider the case where profit tax burden is
higher in the country exhibiting a location advantage. This is the more
reasonable restriction since empirical evidences reveal that corporate tax
rates have always been higher in the most industrialized countries with high
productivity as shown by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) for the European
Union.6 Thus, the condition θ < θ˜ suggests that a firm located in the
high productivity countries receives a higher level of subsidy only if their
6From theoretical standpoint, recent economic geography models with tax competition
using similar assumptions concerning workers and firms show the tax rate is higher in
the country enjoying an advantage (see Gaigne and Riou, 2004 and Ottaviano and Van
Ypersele, 2005).
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productivity advantage is low enough compared with their tax disadvantage.
Intuition behind this result is straightforward. A country combining a weak
productivity advantage with high tax pressure has to give a more generous
subsidy for firms to sustain its attractiveness. When the productivity wedge
becomes high enough, the high productivity country does not need to set
higher subsidy for each firm in order to compensate higher corporate tax
rate.
Now assume tax harmonisation (t1 = t2) or a higher profit taxation in
the low productivity country. This is mechanically associated with higher
subsidy in the low-productivity country. In other words, since tax harmoni-
sation offset pure fiscal incentives of the location choices, the government of
the low-productivity country has to increase its subsidy for firms to a higher
level than the high-productivity one in order to unless partially compensate
its productivity disadvantage.
Finally, whatever the corporate tax rates, it is easy to check that f∗2 −
t2 > f
∗
1 − t1. In words, the subsidy net of profit tax rate is higher in the
low productivity country, regardless of the productivity gap. Some static
comparatives show that ∂(f∗1 − t1)/∂θ < 0 and ∂(f
∗
2 − t2)/∂θ > 0. In other
words, a convergence of the productivity levels implies also a convergence of
net-of-tax subsidies for each firm.
To summarise,
Proposition 1 The country having the lowest productivity sets higher net
of tax subsidies for each firm established in its jurisdiction. The convergence
of the productivity levels implies the convergence of the net of tax subsidies.
Now we can address the relation between trade integration and the equi-
librium level of the subsidy allocated to firms. This relation is captured in
C (τ) which we can write as follows:
C (τ) = Γ (τ) + Υ(τ)
with Γ (τ) = Lτ (b+ cN)2
[
(2a− τb) /2 (cN + 2b)2
]
> 0 andΥ(τ) = −1/ (2A (τ)) <
0.
Firstly, observe that C (τ) doesn’t depend on the possible asymetric
parameters of the economy that is tr and θ. Thus, we can expect that both
subsidies similarly evolve with trade costs. Secondly, C (τ) includes the two
opposite incentives which matter when choosing the level of fr. The first
one refers to the positive impact of the subsidy on the consumer surplus
(Γ (τ)). The second one is related with the cost for immobile households of
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a rise in subsidies (Υ(τ)). For a given budget constraint, hosting more firms
diminishes the share of public spendings for households. Taking both effects
into account gives rise to a bell-shaped relationship between the equilibrium
level of subsidy and trade cost. Indeed, we get ∂f∗r /∂τ = ∂C (τ) /∂τ which
is positive when τ < a (b+ cn) /
(
b2 + 3cn+ c2n2
)
and negative otherwise.
Starting from a low level of trade cost, a first increase in τ favors a race
to the top in subsidies. Since the positive impact of higher agglomeration
on the surplus grows with τ but that the sensitivity of the location choices
to variations of fr decreases with τ
(
∂2λr/∂fr∂τ < 0
)
, government must
promote higher subsidies to attract a given number of firms. This process
comes to an end for a given level of trade cost. Beyond this trade cost, it
becomes too costly to go on offering higher subsidies in terms of the net
benefits from the public policy. Indeed, it is straightforward to check that
the level of subsidy which maximizes the net benefits component of the
objective function is strictly decreasing in τ . Then the sense of the game in
subsidies is reversed and governments are prompted to offer lower subsidies.
However, introducing (14) and (15) in (13) gives
λ∗ =
1
2
+ θ(1− 2B)A(τ) >
1
2
(16)
so that a majority of firms are located in the high productivity country even
though net-of tax subsidies net for firms are higher in the low productivity
country. Additionally, competition in grants cannot prevent full agglomera-
tion of the mobile production when the productivity wedge is high enough.
Indeed, trivial calculations show that λ∗ = 1 when θ ≥ θagglo with
θagglo ≡
1
2(1− 2B)A(τ)
(17)
Hence, the productivity wedge threshold beyond which all firms are located
in the high-productivity country is decreasing with the degree of economic
integration. More generally, a fall in trade barriers favours the location of
firms in the high productivity country.
Because λ∗ > 1/2, the most generous country in terms of subsidy per
firm is not necessary the country with the highest budget devoted to the
total number of firms located in its area. Some calculations show that
∆f ≡ f∗1λ
∗n− f∗2 (1− λ
∗)n
= [(1− 2B)(t1 + t2 + 2C(τ))A(τ)−B] θn+
(t1 − t2)n
2
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Assume first that tax rates on wages and profits are equal in both coun-
tries (ρ1 = ρ2 and t1 = t2 = t) and observe that this condition implies
f∗2 > f
∗
1 . Thus, the total funds devoted to firms are higher in the high
productivity country if the following condition is checked
t >
B
2(1− 2B)A(τ)
−C(τ) ≡ t(τ) > 0
In words, when tax harmonisation prevails on wages and profits, the
budget devoted to firms in the high productivity country may be higher even
if the individual subsidy is lower. This case emerges when the corporate tax
rate is high enough. Indeed, for a given level of agglomeration in the high
productivity country and a given subsidies gap, we can observe that the
difference of public funds distributed to firms in each country increases with
the level of these subsidies. Thus, since fr is an increasing function of t, high
level of taxation favours ∆f > 0. Moreover, when trade integration is well-
advanced this constraint on taxation is weakened as the right hand side of
the inequality is minimized for low level of trade costs. Intuition behind this
result is straighforward : low trade costs favors agglomeration economies
in the high-productivity country, and then the number of recipients of the
subsidy.
Now, let consider how the gap of public funds devoted to firms influences
the gap of budget for households that we can define as ∆h = t (2λ− 1)−∆f .
Mechanically, since the high productivity country always hosts more firms,
tax harmonisation gives rise to lower tax revenues in the low productivity
country. This makes impossible a policy which would spend more both for
firms and households in this last country. Contrary to this, when the high
productivity country allocates more public funds for firms, its government
can also allocates more for households. Two conditions favors the emer-
gence of this scenario. First, the corporate tax rate must be high enough
to allow ∆f > 0. Secondly, trade costs must be relatively high to limit
the number of firms receiving a subsidy. This allows the government of the
high productivity country to sustain a higher level of public spending for
households.
Finally, when we consider that the high productivity country sets higher
corporate tax rate, the difference between countries in public funds to house-
holds does not change while ∆f > 0 becomes more possible. Hence, our
previous results do not change qualitatively but the case where both the
budget devoted to firms and households is more important in country 1 is
more likely.
Hence, to summarise,
13
Proposition 2 Provided that both trade costs and corporate tax rates are
high, the high-productivity country can spend more for firms and households
than the low-productivity country. Whatever the level of trade costs and
taxation, this last country is unable to have the same spending policy (∆f,h <
0).
Finally, to complete the analysis, we can determine the type of agent
(workers or firms) who is the net recipient in the redistribution system for
each country. Observe that f∗2 − t2 > 0 is always checked. This implies
that h∗2 − ρ2 < 0, according to (11). This means that the tax burden for
households (resp., firms) is higher (resp., lower) than subsidies in the low-
productivity country. On the other hand, we have f∗1 − t1 < 0 when
θ >
C(τ)
B
≡ θ̂.
Hence, firms located in the high productivity country have a tax rate su-
perior to subsidies, provided that the productivity wedge is high enough or
trade costs
take extreme values since C (τ) described a bell-shaped curve with re-
spect to τ . For instance, if the trade integration process is well advanced,
the less vigorous subsidy competition may benefit to households in the high
productivity country who can become the net-recipients of the public policy.
Whatever the level of trade costs, this cannot occur in the low productivity
country where the pressure to attract firms always makes them the net-
recipients. This results gives an illustration of how trade integration may
place immobile households in different positions depending on their location.
To sum up,
Proposition 3 Regardless of trade costs, households located in the low pro-
ductivity country are net-contributors of the subsidies for firms. In contrast,
households living in the high productivity country are net-recipients of the
public funds provided that its productivity are high enough and/or trade costs
reach extreme values.
5 On the optimality of subsidies
Another question, fundamental as well, is to determine whether the sub-
sidy competition among countries leads to inefficiently high subsidisation
of firms at the expense of the households. From a traditional model of
tax competition without coordination, Keen and Marchand (1997) show
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that competition for mobile capital leads to over-provision of public inputs.
More precisely, starting from the non-cooperative equilibrium, and holding
tax rates constant, their analysis reveals that welfare would be improved by
a coordinated reduction in the provision of local public inputs and a cor-
responding increase in the public provision of local public goods benefiting
immobile consumer. Such a result emerges because all externalities in the
framework developed by Keen and Marchand (1997) imply too high level of
public input. In a given country, the capital outflow inducing by a rise in
the amount of public input in other countries affects welfare through three
routes: (i) capital rent falls (ii) wage rate decreases (iii) tax revenues de-
cline. In our framework, the first two externalities are absents since firm
owners are assumed to be located outside the economy and the wage rate
does not depend on the location of firms. However, our model exhibits an
externality passing through the consumption of private commodities. Recall
that the consumer’s surplus in each country varies positively with the mass
of firms. Consequently, because the difference in subsidies to firms matters
for the location choice of their production, an externality passes through the
consumers surplus. When deciding its level of subsidies to firms, a country
does not internalise the indirect effects on the surplus of consumers located
in other countries.
We also have an externality passing through public funds devoted to
households. However, this externality is not symmetric. Recall that we
have
h∗1L1 − ρ1L1 = −(f
∗
1 − t1)λ
∗n and h∗2L1 − ρ2L2 = −(f
∗
2 − t2)(1− λ
∗)n.
Because f∗2 − t2 > 0, an outflow of firms in the low productivity country
leads to higher level of subisidies for households. In contrast, in the high
productivity country, a decreasing mass of firms implies a falling amount of
public spending for households living in this country, provided that θ > θ̂.
To quantify these externalities, we successively focus on the aggregated
consumers’ surplus and the net benefit of the public policy to households,
the sum of these two components being the total welfare, given by
WT ≡W1 +W2 = L(S1 + S2) + (t1 − f1)λ
∗n+ (t2 − f2) (1− λ
∗)n
Let first consider the aggregated consumers’ surplus ST ≡ L(S1 + S2).
To determine the non-optimality of the decentralised subsidy policies arising
from the surplus, we introduce the values of each Nash grant f∗1 , f
∗
2 in
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dST/dfr and evaluate the sign of the resulting expressions. Some calculations
reveal that
dST
df2
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1 ;f2=f
∗
2
> 0
dST
df1
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1 ;f2=f
∗
2
< 0
which suggest that a coordinated policy focusing on the consumer surplus
alone would reduce the subsidy to firms in the high-productivity coun-
try while increasing it in the other country. Intuition behind this result
is straightforward and related with the location equilibrium. Indeed, the co-
ordinated policy would induce a lower level of agglomeration suggesting that
the location of production at the decentralised equilibrium is too agglomer-
ated. When deciding its level of grants, each country do not internalize that
it affects the consumer surplus of the other country. Consequently, more
dispersion of mobile firms is needed to maximize the global consumers’ sur-
plus.
Now consider the externalities arising from the supply of subsidies de-
voted to households. Set H the total net revenues received by households
where
H ≡ λ∗n (t1 − f1) + (1− λ
∗)n (t2 − f2) .
It is straighforward to check that
sign
{
dH
df1
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1 ;f2=f
∗
2
}
= sign {−1 + 2θ(4B − 1)A(τ)} ≷ 0 when θ ≷ θ¨
and
sign
{
dH
df2
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1 ;f2=f
∗
2
}
= sign {−1− 2θ(4B − 1)A(τ)} < 0
with θ¨ ≡
(12b+ 7cn) cnLτ2 (b+ cn)
2 (4b+ 3cn) (2b+ cn)
< θagglo.
Clearly, focusing on the consumer surplus or the direct net benefit of
the public policy for households may lead to divergent coordinated policies.
While f2 may be excessive when we only observe the net benefit of house-
holds, it may be considered as too low from the consumer surplus point of
view. Similarly, f1 can reach too high values for the aggregate consumer
surplus while the externality may work in an opposite direction concerning
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the direct effect of subsidy for households. On this last point, it is worth
to note the significant influence of trade costs. For low enough trade costs
such that θ > θ¨, the coordinated policy will improve the total level of grant
for households by advocating more subsidies to firms in country 1 and the
opposite for country 2. Such a policy consists in promoting higher agglom-
eration of the tax base in the high productivity country by expecting that
the lower level of subsidy to households in country 1 and the loss in tax base
in country 2 will be more than compensated by the increasing tax base in
country 1 and by the decreasing net contribution to the public policy by
households living in country 2. This effect will be stronger, the higher the
tax base elasticity to fr will be. Since this elasticity decreases with τ , low
trade costs could imply a coordinated policy in favour of firms located in the
high productivity country in order to raise the total net benefits for workers.
Let now evaluate which externality is dominant. To identify this, we
introduce the values of each Nash subsidies resulting from non-cooperative
policies in dWT/dfr. For the low productivity country we have
dWT
df2
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1 ;f2=f
∗
2
< 0
while we obtain
dWT
df1
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1 ;f2=f
∗
2
≤ 0 for all θ such that λ ≤ 1
for the other country. Hence like Keen and Marchand (1997), our framework
displays a compositional inefficiency in the public policy which may be solved
by an increase in the public spendings devoted to immobile consumers in
both countries. To sum up
Proposition 4 The share of public spending for firms is too high in each
country.
Our previous analysis raises the question whether the pattern of pub-
lic spending is efficient from the social optimum point of view. We have
shown that immobile residents enjoy a gain from a coordinated policy. It is
straightforward to see that the resulting decrease in the subsidies to firms
is Pareto-improving for each country. Indeed, it will be the case if, around
the Nash subsidies for firms, the following inequalities are checked:{
dW1 =
∂W1
∂f1
df1 +
∂W1
∂f2
df2 > 0
dW2 =
∂W2
∂f1
df1 +
∂W2
∂f2
df2 > 0
(18)
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Recalling that dWr/dfr = 0 at the Nash equilibrium and dfr,s < 0, these
inequalities are checked when dWr/dfs < 0 which is a corollary of the social
optimum analysis since
dWT
dfr
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2
=
dWs
dfr
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2
< 0
Nevertheless, decomposing dWs/dfr allows to go further in the identifi-
cation of the two externalities that each government generates for the other
one. Indeed, we have

dW1
df2
∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2
= L
dS1
df2
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
dH1
df2
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ if θ<θˆ
< 0
dW2
df1
∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2
= L
dS2
df1
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
dH2
df1
∣∣∣∣
f1=f
∗
1
;f2=f
∗
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0
Considering first the externality acting through the consumer surplus,
the effect is unambigously negative because of the tax base erosion effect
induced by an increase of the other country’s subsidy to firm. Now consider
the externality arising from the direct net benefit of the subsidy policy. Since
households of the low productivity country are always the net contributors
to the public system, an erosion of their tax base may be advantageous for
them. Thus, by increasing its level of subsidy and its attractiveness, the
high productivity country generates a positive externality. The same mech-
anism with the same causes may occur in the last country as long as the
households living there are the net-contributors of the public policy that
is, provided that the productivity advantage is low enough and/or trade
costs are relatively high. Otherwise, beyond θˆ, this externality acts in the
opposite direction. Households living in the most productive country be-
comes net-recipients and suffer from a higher attractiveness of the other
country. In other words, the direction of this externality perceived by the
high-productivity country depends on the ability of its government to make
firms the net-contributors of the public policy. Finally, despite the ambigu-
ous sense of the externality arising from the sign of dHr/dfs, an unilateral
increase in subsidy for firms generates an overall negative externality. In-
deed, the outflow of tax base is too harmful for consumer’s surplus to be
counteracted by the potential positive effect arising from the direct net ben-
efits for households.
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6 Conclusion
With economic integration and international tax coordination agreements,
the level of public funds allocated to companies becomes a key element in the
location of mobile production. Hence, national governments have a stronger
incentive to compete in subsidy to attract firms. As a result, such a non
cooperative behavior could induce a rise in public funds for firms at the
expense of households.
In this paper we have considered asymmetric competition in subsidies
for firms when tax revenues are devoted to both residents and mobile firms.
Interestingly, we have shown that promoting tax harmonisation leads the
country having the lowest productivity to set higher subsidies for firms. In-
deed, the high productivity country will be the most generous for firms only
when it suffers from a tax disadvantage and only benefits from a weak pro-
ductivity advantage. Moreover, trade integration has very different effects
on the role of immobile households in the public sector of each country.
While households located in the low-productivity country seem to be the
net-contributors of their public sector regardless of trade costs, residents of
the other country can shift from a position of net-contributor to net-recipient
-for a given productivity advantage- when trade costs are low enough.
Finally, we identify two main externalities which make the Nash equilib-
rium in subsidies an inefficient equilibrium. Even if these two externalities
may act in opposite directions, we show that a coordinated policy promoting
an increase of the public spendings devoted to households in both countries
will be beneficial, as suggested by Keen and Marchand (1997). Despite a
different framework our results are convergent. Clearly, assuming foreign
direct investments and abstracting from externalities arising from capital
rent, our model also suggests that governments could spend too much for
firms. The robustness of this result should recall that tax harmonisation
which is frequently debated by policy makers only focuses on a particular
aspect of a more global problem relative to the inefficiencies that emerge
when countries compete for firms.
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